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French Antitrust Developments
The Competition Commission, which, on July 19, 1977, replaced the
Technical Commission regarding illegal concerted practises and abuse of
dominant position, is basically acting under the same Article 50 and subse-
quent Articles of the Ordinance dated June 30, 1945 (formerly Article 59 bis
and subsequent Articles); it is, however, assuming a much more active role
in the enforcement of competition, pursuant to the abandonment of price
controls. Under an instruction dated May 16, 1980, it has been assigned as
priority missions to check the practises leading to price increases (or
preventing price decreases) and those aiming at the protection of a domi-
nant or status quo position. It is also apparent that the Commission is more
and more influenced by the EEC Rulings.
Its role is three-fold:
i) Advice on illegal concerted practises and abuse of dominant position;
ii) Advice on concentrations;
iii) Advice to the government on draft bills concerning competition.
I-Prevention of Illegal Concerted Practises and
Abuse of Dominant Position
A. Prevention of Illegal Concerted Practises
1. FORM
The concerted practises may result from written agreements or from fac-
tual situations.
In case of a GIE,1 the Commission takes into account the impact on the
market of the companies associated within the GIE (Groupement d'Int~ret
Economique) in order to determine whether its real purpose is to increase
*Ms. Nion practices law in Paris.
'A GIE is a type of non-profit legal cooperation among entities with the purpose of encour-
aging companies in sales, manufacturing or other activities.
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or to restrict the competition. 2 On the other hand, the Commission consid-
ers that companies in the same group (more than 50 percent owned by the
same parent) are not covered by Article 50.3
2. PRICE FIXING
The Commission, in several of its opinions, found that common lists of
prices and/or discounts were illegal when published by professional organi-
zations or groups of enterprises. 4 There are decrees specifically prohibiting
the establishment of price lists in certain fields. Professional organizations
for importers and wholesalers on December 27, 1979, strongly recom-
mended that their members not publish recommended price lists or uniform
sales terms and conditions, except in cases of joint advertising.
The Commission is also of the opinion that agreements concerning the
exchange of information between manufacturers, wholesalers or central
organizations on prices of competitive products (those which can be substi-
tuted one for the other) can have the same restrictive effects, if the buyers
and sellers can be identified.5
In a widely publicized opinion, issued on September 27, 1979, the Com-
mission recommended heavy fines against a group of manufacturers and
distributors in the household appliances and electro acoustical fields who
attempted to limit the price decreases beyond a notional "normal margin. '" 6
3. DivisION OF THE MARKET AND OTHER
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN COMPETITORS
The Commission is of the opinion that the division of a market on a
geographical basis between competitors is illegal.7 It is also of the opinion
that agreements fixing production quotas, restricting membership or impos-
2Affaire du GIE Inter Nougat, Meeting of the Commission of July 8, 1980, Bulletin Officiel
de la Concurrence et de la Consommation, September 12, 1980, Pp. 208 and following. Affaire
GIE France Explosifs, Meeting of the Commission of January I1, 1979, Bulletin Officiel des
Services des Prix, April 20, 1979, Pp. 115 and following.
'Affaire Assainissement en Region Parisienne, Meeting of the Commission of January 24,
1980, B.O.S.P. May 15, 1980, P. 104.
4Affaire Negoce du Verre Plat, F6d~ration Nationale des Entreprises de Miroiterie-Vitrerie,
Meeting of the Commission of March 9, 1978, B.O.S.P. of June 1, 1978, P. 190. Affaire Negoce
en gros du mat6riel 6lectrique d'Installation Legrand, Meeting of the Commission of March
23, 1978, B.O.S.P. of June 1, 1978, P. 192.
'Affaire Association Confort-Regulation, Meeting of the Commission of June 5, 1980, Bulle-
tin Officiel de la Concurrence et de la Consommation of August 8, 1980, Pp. 181 and follow-
ing. Affaire March6 du Vinaigre, Meeting of the Commission of October 18, 1979, B.O.S.P. of
December 29, 1979, Pp. 332 and following. Affaire des Machines A Bois d'une meme marque,
Meeting of the Commission of October II, 1979, Pp. 301 and following. Affaire des vaccins
anti-aphteux, Meeting of the Commission of September 10, 1980, B.O.S.P. of October 30, 1980,
Pp. 244 and following.
'Affaires Darty, Auchan, Conforama, Arthur Martin, Lincoln, Philips, Schneider, Thomson-
Brandt, ITT Oc6anic, Miele, Rositres, B.O.S.P. of February 9, 1980, Pp. 29 and following.7Affaire Fabricants d'6mulsions routieres de bitume, Meeting of the Commission of Novem-
ber 23, 1978, B.O.S.P. of January Ii, 1979, Pp. 3 and following.
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ing quality labels are illegal. 8
4. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIPS
The Commission expressed the opinion that exclusive distribution con-
tracts may be illegal, when the product or the service is not new on the
French market or is being successfully sold in it.
In the Commission's opinion, in these cases, there is no economic justifi-
cation for restricting the sale of the product or the service. Such agreements
were held illegal where a manufacturer and/or the distributor(s) were
deemed to have a dominant or very strong market position.
The Commission even took the position in its opinion dated September
27, 1979, that an exclusive territory could not validly be assigned to a dis-
tributor selected on the basis of its technical qualifications, even though
such distributor was not in a strong market position.9
A conclusion as to the principles may not, however, be drawn from such
case, since the Commission emphasized that each distributorship agreement
needed to be evaluated within its economic context.
5. COOPERATIVE SELLING AGREEMENTS
Even though such agreements are generally not illegal, it is the view of
the Commission that in case distributors receive a discriminatory price
reduction in exchange for an .undertaking not to distribute competitive
products, the agreement is illegal.
6. THE GROUPEMENTS D'ACHAT
(PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS)
Similarly, even though such organizations are generally looked upon
with favor by the authorities, the Commission is of the opinion that the
boycott of non-members by such an organization (which can be effective if
it has a dominant position) is illegal. A non-competition agreement con-
cluded between wholesalers who are members of such organization is also
considered to be illegal by the Commission.!°
7. DISCOUNTS
The Commission expressed in several cases the opinion that the discounts
based on the purchases (or potential purchases) of clients of a cartel are
illegal. I I
'Affaire Section de l'assurance construction, Meeting of the Commission of December 20,
1979, Bulletin Officiel de la Concurrence et de la Consommation, June 14, 1980, Pp. 146 and
following. Affaire Fabricants de Nougat, Meeting of the Commission of July 8, 1980, Bulletin
Officiel de la Concurrence et de la Consommation, September 12, 1980, Pp. 208 and following.
'Bulletin Officiel du Service des Prix, February 9, 1980, P. 32.
'Affaire Commercialisation des briquets non rechargeables, Meeting of the Commission of
May 11, 1978, B.O.S.P. of June I, 1978, P. 194.
"Affaire du Secteur des tubes d'acier, Syndicat National du Commerce des tubes et rac-
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8. ILLEGAL AGREEMENTS IN PUBLIC BIDS
Advance agreements between bidders as to which will be the lowest bid-
der in public bids were considered illegal and have been most severely sanc-
tioned, i.e. all such cases were referred to the Courts for action.12
B. Abuse of a Dominant Position
1. The concept of "dominant position" is being progressively defined.
The Commission considers that the relevant market must be determined
on the basis of the following three criteria (to be considered together):
(i) whether a product or service can be substituted for another; (ii) the size
of the market (by localization or allocation); (iii) the type of customers and
its specific needs.
A dominant position can be held by one company or by several compa-
nies who are parties to an agreement, or even by companies completely
independent of each other who may not have concluded any "entente"
(concerted practise).
The fact that a Company or a group of companies or several independent
companies hold an important percentage of the market, may lead to a pre-
sumption of a dominant position. However, two companies were found to
have a dominant position even though they held only 20 and 36 percent of
the market.13 On the other hand, in the Zinc and Feudor cases, two compa-
nies were not considered to have a dominant position, even though they
held a very large share of the market.' 4
The products used by the manufacturers themselves need not be taken
into account in the computation of their share of the market.
In order to determine whether a company is in a dominant position, the
Commission examines the ease of penetration of the market, the impor-
tance of the investments required, the existence of potential competition,
the technological advance, the behavior, etc.
A company is deemed to be in a dominant position when it can ignore
the competition and choose the position or role it will play vis-A-vis its com-
petitors, its suppliers or its clients.
2. Once a dominant position has been established, it is necessary for the
cords, Meeting of the Commission of January 12, 1978, B.O.S.P. of June 1, 1978, Pp. 187 and
following, particularly P. 189.
'"Affaire des Entreprises de Travaux Publics dans les Dtpartements du Cher et de l'Indre,
Meeting of the Commission of June 22, 1978, B.O.S.P. of August 11, 1978, Pp. 263 and follow-
ing. Affaire des Entreprises de Travaux Publics dans la Rdgion Parisienne, Meeting of the
Commission of November 30, 1978, B.O.S.P. of January 11, 1979, Pp. 4 and following. Affaire
Secteur de I'Assainissement en R6gion Parisienne, Decision of the Commission of January 24,
1980, B.O.S.P. of May 15, 1980, P. 104.
"Affaire Vinaigre, B.O.S.P. of December 29, 1979, Pp. 332 and following, Meeting of the
Commission of October 18, 1979.
' B.O.S.P. of June 1, 1978, P. 194; B.O.S.P. of May 19, 1979, P. 143.
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Commission to prove that it is used to hinder the normal functioning of the
market. The Commission considers that certain contractual provisions,
which are not abusive in themselves, should be prohibited, since they pre-
vent any potential competition (e.g., excessive duration of contracts, exclu-
sive distributorship or supply agreements, purchase or sales quotas,
determination of the profit margin of the distributors, refusal to sell, crea-
tion of a joint subsidiary, discriminatory pricing, etc.).
C. Excuse
Under Article 51, section 2, of the ordinance, an enterprise may be
absolved from its illegal practises, if it can demonstrate that it was necessary
for the development of the economic progress. The burden of proof is on
the claimant who must be able to show that the economic advantage out-
weighed the disadvantages of the illegal practises and that such progress
would not otherwise have been possible. It is to be noted that the company
must acknowledge the concerted practise or the dominant position in order
to be able to claim the benefit of Article 5 1. In the Zinc case, the Commis-
sion admitted the validity of a cartel, subject to certain conditions, in order
to avoid an economic crisis.' 5
D. Sanctions
The Commission takes into account the economic effects of the incrimi-
nated practises. It further takes into account certain aggravating circum-
stances, such as bad faith, duration of the practise or attenuating
circumstances, such as the financial situation of the companies, the purpose
of the practises, the attitude of the public authorities, etc.
In most cases, the Commission chose to recommend exemplary fines or
injunctions, rather than sending the cases to the courts. Only the cases
relating to public bids have been referred to the Court so far. 16
It also verifies whether its injunctions are being applied and in case of
non-compliance, heavy fines may be assessed. 17
Il-Advice on Concentrations
There are only four cases so far, since the notification is optional and
since the limits are relatively high: 40 percent or 25 percent of the market
according to whether the concentration is horizontal or not. Furthermore,
the Commission does not have the right to take the initiative of an investi-
'"Meeting of the Commission of February 8, 1979, B.O.S.P. of May 19, 1979, P. 143.
"'Affaire de la Confection Militaire, Meeting of the Commission of January 25, 1979,
B.O.S.P. of April 5, 1979, Pp. 97 and following. Affaire March6 d'Electrification rurale du
D6partement des Ardennes, Meeting of the Commission of March 15, 1979, B.O.S.P. of May 5,
1979, Pp. 126 and following.
"Affaire Decaux, Meeting of the Commission of April 24, 1980 (1 million French francs).
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gation, but may only act upon the request of the minister. The first case
concerned the merger of manufacturing assets of small welded steel pipes
(Vallourec) with pipes of Providence.' 8
The Commission considered that the economic advantages of the merger
outweighed its anti-competitive aspects, provided certain guarantees were
given by the parties, i.e. that the surviving company will not further
increase its influence on the market of steel pipes in France and that the
surviving company will not impose any exclusivity undertaking to its selling
network. Any further concentration plan whatsoever among them would
have to be notified to the minister.
The Commission took a similar position in the case of the merger
betweeen Segma and Generale Occidentale. 19
Ill-Advice to the Government on Draft Bills
Concerning Competition
The Commission has been consulted fourteen times since its origin,
mostly by the government. However, those opinions have not been pub-
lished, except for the one dated January 10, 1980, relating to sales with an
abnormally low profit margin for well-known products (prix d'appel) in
order to attract the clientele.
Conclusion
Inquiries of the administration relating to competition are increasing sig-
nificantly. They have recently focused on distribution and consumer goods
and services. The development of the activities of the competition Commis-
sion as well as that of the EEC antitrust division should cause the compa-
nies to have their position continuously reviewed in order to ensure
compliance with the rapidly evolving regulations in this field.
8 B'.O.S.P. of May 19, 1979.
'
9 B.O.S.P. No. 24 of December 1, 1979, Meeting of November 15, 1979.
